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Question 
What does the evidence tell us about how the branding and communication of development 
assistance can impact on the perceptions by different audiences (public, decision makers, 
beneficiaries) in recipient countries, both in humanitarian situations and in more ‘stable’ 
contexts? 
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1. Overview 
In recent years, international donors and non-governmental organisations have placed increasing 
emphasis on prominently branding the development interventions that they fund. Spreading 
knowledge about the identity of an aid project sponsor is one mechanism by which donor 
governments conduct local level diplomacy with direct beneficiaries and through which they hope 
to influence public opinion. The most common method of spreading information about the 
sponsorship of development interventions is through visual branding
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.  Though branding has 
been part of U.S. aid policy since the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the emphasis on this 
foreign policy tool has increased as part of the post-9/11 National Security Strategy. Other donor 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, have followed suit with their own branding policies.   
Although there is a broad assumption that branding improves attitudes toward the donor amongst 
the recipients of foreign assistance, very little rigorous evidence has been collected to verify this, 
and the size of the potential effect of branding on recipient attitudes is unknown. In addition, little 
is know about whether donor’s branding strategies effectively communicate that the foreign 
donor acts as sponsor of a given intervention. Most of the empirical work that examines the 
impact of aid on public perceptions takes the form of in-country case studies. The literature 
appears to focus exclusively on USAID programmes. This includes studies focusing on U.S. 
‘hearts and minds’ campaigns in conflict zones, as well as studies focusing on disaster relief aid.  
Neither USAID nor any other foreign aid donor has outlined explicitly a branding “theory of 
change”, and the merits of different communication strategies for branding aid have not been 
explored in detail in the literature. The USAID branding website links to guidelines about 
branding and to files containing some of the logos used on USAID materials
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.  The 
documentation makes it clear that the agency wants to establish its brand, but the specific long-
term objectives of this endeavor and the mechanisms of attitudinal change through which they 
would be realised are not identified.   
Key messages 
 Studies on the impact of foreign aid on public opinion about donors in recipient 
countries provide mixed results. There is some evidence that greater information about 
the foreign funding of development projects leads to more positive attitudes toward the donor 
and companies associated with the donor.  
 However, other studies suggest that branding can produce negative developmental 
consequences. It may be that information about external funding of development 
interventions undermines citizens’ support for their domestic governments.  
 By contrast, other authors have argued that successful management of foreign aid 
relationships may increase the legitimacy of the recipient state in the eyes of its 
citizens.    
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 Beyond citizens in developing countries, branding may also target donor publics and donor legislatures, serving 
as a tool to communicate to domestic audiences what foreign aid efforts accomplish. Branding increases 
transparency by providing visual evidence of specific development contributions (Shah 2010)   
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 It has been argued that communications strategies can raise expectations amongst 
recipient publics unrealistically high, leading to dissatisfaction with the actual results of 
programmes on the ground. 
 It has also been argued that donors should focus on transparency rather than 
branding. A fixation with branding aid projects can shift the donor’s objective away from 
improving long-term development outcomes toward making sure they receive credit, which 
may be counter-productive.  
2. Perceptions towards donors and donor countries 
In terms of the audience in the aid-receiving country, the logic behind branding foreign aid is that 
development interventions are likely to be perceived as helpful and beneficial by local 
populations. By branding their interventions, donors hope to capitalise on this  perception by 
transferring the positive associations from the development intervention to the donor country that 
has funded it.  Dietrich et al (2015) note that this theory of change relies on two critical 
assumptions about what a brand connotes. They suggest that both these assumptions may be 
flawed in any given case.  
First, there is an assumption that people associate the donor brand with the donor government. 
However, given low levels of literacy and education, Dietrich et al (2015) point out it is far from 
certain that people exposed to a particular donor logo will understand that the logo is meant to 
make them think about a particular far-away country. Second, for a brand to convey the specific 
message that foreign aid donors want, there must be an assumption that people will associate 
the presence of the donor brand with donor sponsorship of the project. While this may be 
obvious to someone thinking of a development intervention as a foreign aid project, a citizen in a 
developing country might instead think of a logo on a sign or a building as a piece of advertising 
that is unrelated to financial assistance (Ibid).  
Recent empirical work has emerged that explores the effects of information about foreign aid on 
attitudes toward the donor country. The evidence is mixed, with some studies finding a positive 
relationship and others reporting more ambivalent results.    
  
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief  
Goldsmith et al (2014) use cross-country data to make systematic causal inferences about the 
impacts of aid on public opinion in recipient countries. They show that a United States aid 
programme targeted to address HIV and AIDS substantially improved perceptions of the U.S.  
In 2003, the U.S. established the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which 
has provided assistance in more than 80 developing countries. Its declared objectives include 
stopping the spread of HIV and AIDS, supporting the treatment of people suffering from HIV and 
AIDS, and mitigating the indirect consequences of the epidemic. USAID has made sure that the 
fund has a high profile in recipient countries and has carefully and deliberately branded 
PEPFAR-funded work. The stars and stripes of the U.S. flag are a prominent feature of the 
PEPFAR logo, and the signing of PEPFAR country agreements is often undertaken by high 
profile figures in the U.S. administration, increasing in-country media exposure and public 
awareness. In countries with high HIV prevalence rates, PEPFAR has a significant media profile 
with improvements in HIV outcomes frequently being attributed to the programme. 
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Using a large multinational survey with a battery of questions, Goldsmith et al (2014) provide 
evidence that PEPFAR has had a substantial positive affect on how the general public in 
recipient countries regard the U.S. leadership. The results of specification tests, placebo tests, 
and robustness tests suggest that the observed effects are not statistical artifacts. They posit that 
these results stem from the fact that PEPFAR is targeted to address a widely understood need; 
has been sustained over some time; is effective; and is highly visible. Their study implies that in 
addition to its potential humanitarian benefits, foreign aid that has these qualities can serve an 
important strategic goal by fostering positive perceptions of the donor country among recipient 
populations.  
 
USAID funding for health clinics in Bangladesh 
To understand the effects of information about foreign aid on attitudes toward the donor country, 
Dietrich et al (2015) embedded an experiment in a nationwide survey in U.S. since 1997. In the 
control version of the survey, the video was branded at the bottom of the screen with the Smiling 
Sun logo and name. In the treatment condition, the video was branded with the USAID symbol, 
and respondents subsequently were informed about the history of U.S. funding for the health 
clinics. Immediately following the video, respondents in both groups were asked a series of open-
ended questions to assess their response to the branding of foreign aid. 
The authors found that only a very small portion of survey respondents associated the USAID 
logo with the idea of United States government funding. Whilst this initial result suggests that 
USAID’s branding technique may not be an effective tool of communication in the developing 
world, respondents who had previously been exposed to the logo (through interaction with the 
development intervention) or who had higher levels of education were more likely to correctly 
infer the identity of the project sponsor after exposure to the USAID logo.  
Overall, the authors concede that if the success of foreign aid branding depends on citizens 
correctly linking a donor logo with the donor country and drawing an inference that the presence 
of the logo implies sponsorship of the development intervention, their evidence was not 
encouraging. Whilst the study did find some evidence that providing information about the foreign 
funding of development projects to Bangladeshi citizens led to a positive perception towards the 
donor and companies associated with the donor, the authors note that the effect was only slight. 
Finally, the study did not find evidence of a negative impact of foreign aid on domestic 
government legitimacy. In fact, information about the foreign sponsorship of a development 
intervention increased some respondents’ confidence in their local governments.  
 
Perceptions towards donors in conflict-affected countries 
In conflict-affected countries, it is hoped that aid can help foster supportive attitudes to donors 
and donor countries, which in turn will engender positive changes in behaviour amongst the 
general populace. Citizens may see the benefits of development cooperation, or may simply 
begin to trust international actors. The prospects of aid may in turn incentivise the local 
population to share critical information with international forces. Alternatively, when the local 
population is actively resisting foreign military and civilian actors, the prospect of aid may 
stimulate more peaceful behavior. However, a change in attitude may not automatically lead to a 
constructive change in behavior. An individual might, for example, hedge his actions by 
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cooperating with both international actors and local armed groups in order to maximize benefits 
and distribute risk (Böhnke and Zürcher, 2013).  
Afghanistan: Evidence from studies on the perception of Afghan citizens suggests they are 
either not affected by the presence of foreign aid, or else are negatively affected.  
Böhnke and Zürcher (2013) conducted a micro-level longitudinal study of 80 communities in 
northeast Afghanistan between 2007 and 2009, and did not find a positive relationship between 
aid and the attitudes of the local population toward international civilian and military actors. Their 
data suggests that the principal drivers of attitudes toward foreign military actors are security 
concerns and levels of household resources. 
Through interviews and focus group discussions with a range of respondents in key institutions 
and in communities in Afghanistan, Fishstein and Wilder (2012) found that aid and development 
projects were consistently described in negative terms by Afghans
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.  Perceptions of the misuse 
and abuse of aid resources fueled a growing distrust of the government and generated 
skepticism regarding the role of the government and aid agencies. The chief complaints were 
that projects were insufficient in terms of quantity and of quality; unevenly distributed 
geographically, politically, and socially; and associated with extensive corruption.  
Palestine: According to a baseline survey carried out by USAID in 2009, 32 percent of 
Palestinians reported holding higher opinions of the American people directly because of the aid 
given in their name. However, in terms of attitudes towards the American government, there is 
evidence that an overwhelming number of Palestinians continued to harbor negative views. A 
2011 poll from the Pew Research Center showed that 80 percent of Palestinians held 
unfavorable views toward the U.S. government, while only 18 percent held positive ones (Pew 
Research Center 2011).   
Brunner and Nada (2012) investigate whether there is a meaningful relationship between the 
amount of money spent on foreign aid and public opinion towards the donor in the West Bank. 
The authors examined extant literature on the subject and conducted interviews with key 
stakeholders in the United States and the West Bank. Their study determined that aid to the 
West Bank did not significantly impact public opinion towards the U.S., despite the large sum of 
assistance that had been lent to the territory. American foreign policy, USAID’s high degree of 
politicisation, and a general lack of awareness of local projects combined to neutralise any 
significant effect that aid would have had on Palestinian opinions toward the US. Branding did 
not play a significant positive or negative role in shaping Palestinians’ perceptions of donors. 
 
Perceptions towards donors in the aftermath of humanitarian 
disaster 
Following an earthquake in northern Pakistan in 2005, the U.S. pledged significant levels of aid, 
eventually totalling more than $500 million. A 2006 Global Attitudes Survey (Pew Research 
Center 2006) found that the vast majority of Pakistanis were aware of American relief efforts – 85 
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 Research was conducted in five provinces, three in the south and east (Helmand, Paktia, and Uruzgan) which 
were considered insecure and two in the north (Balkh and Faryab) which were considered relatively secure, as 
well as in Kabul city. 
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percent said they had heard about post-earthquake aid – and views of the U.S. had improved 
modestly, with 27 percent of Pakistanis giving the U.S. a positive rating, up from 23 percent the 
previous year. Andrabi and Das (2010) suggest that exposure to foreign assistance had a long-
lasting and statistically significant impact on affected villagers’ trust of foreigners in the aftermath 
of the earthquake. However, the authors found that positive perceptions tapered off as distance 
from the fault line increased, suggesting that the impact was localised among those who 
benefited directly from the aid or who came from communities that benefited.  
At the national level, the goodwill receded quickly. By spring 2007, U.S. favourability had slipped 
to 15 per cent in Pakistan (Pew Research Center 2007). Similarly, the U.S. received no image 
boost in 2011, despite providing nearly $600 million in disaster relief following the 2010 floods. 
Only 11 percent of Pakistanis offered a favourable opinion of the U.S. in an April 2011 Pew 
survey – a decline of six percentage points from 2010 (Wike 2012). In an opinion piece 
commenting on the results of these attitudinal surveys in Pakistan, Richard Wike, Associate 
Director of Pew Global Attitudes Project, suggests that distrust of American motives and 
opposition to key elements of U.S. foreign policy may run too deep in Pakistan for humanitarian 
efforts to have a significant impact over the long term (Ibid). He argues that the lesson for 
communications strategies in the context of disaster relief efforts is that they are more likely to 
have a significant effect on public attitudes in countries where there is at least a reservoir of pre-
existing goodwill toward the donor country (Ibid). 
3. Perceptions towards recipient governments 
While donor branding aims to improve the views of citizens in aid-receiving countries toward the 
donor, there is also the possibility that information about the external funding of essential goods 
and services can influence citizens’ views of their own government.  
 Some authors have suggested that widespread public information about the presence of 
donors in a country may signal a lack of competence or willingness on the part of the 
government to provide basic goods and services, rendering governments unable to make 
legitimate demands of their citizens (Dietrich et al 2015) For example, if basic goods and 
services are being clearly funded by foreign aid donors rather than directly through tax 
revenues, this could undermine the fiscal contract between the state and its citizens 
according to which states exchange public services for tax receipts. By not being seen to fulfil 
its obligations within the terms of the tax bargain, the state could lose legitimacy in the eyes 
of its citizens. Through lowering the motivation of citizens to comply with tax regulations, this 
potential disconnect could lead to a situation where the greater visibility of foreign aid actually 
undermines the quality of governance in a state (Ibid).  
 Guiteras and Mobarak (2014) show in a field experiment that the introduction of subsidies for 
the construction of sanitation facilities in rural Bangladesh initially increased citizen support 
for the local government, until they were given information that the subsidies came from an 
NGO and that the local government played no role in obtaining them. At this point, support 
for the local government returned to the baseline level.  
 Carnegie and Dolan (2015) use survey data to investigate the effect of aid on a government’s 
reputation in the context of responding to natural disasters. They suggest that foreign aid can 
undermine a recipient government’s domestic reputation for competence by weakening the 
role of the government in public service provision. They also argue that receipt of aid can 
undermine a state’s international reputation for good governance. They demonstrate that 
7 
some governments reject foreign aid as a way of signalling their competence and self-
sufficiency to the international community. For example, in 2006 Eritrea announced that it 
would no longer accept foreign aid. A political advisor to Eritrea’s president and head of 
Eritrea’s ruling party stated, “We really don’t see any need for [aid] ... Africa has within itself 
the capacity to develop its own economy...We can do it on our own”. Yet many analysts have 
argued that Eritrea is not self-reliant, and in fact desperately needs the aid (Ibid: 2). Carnegie 
and Dolan (2015) suggest that discreetly delivered aid that aims to build a government’s 
capacity for public service provision may be preferable in some circumstances than clearly 
branded and highly visible aid, because it will seem less threatening to the recipient 
government’s international standing. 
Other studies call into question the extent to which visible foreign aid has a detrimental impact on 
state-society relations in recipient countries.  
 In experimental survey data from India, Dietrich and Winters (2015) found no evidence that 
favorability ratings for domestic government officials or institutions decreased when 
individuals received information about the foreign funding of a development project.  
 It has been argued that the successful management of relationships with foreign aid donors 
may in fact help legitimise the state and its institutions. The presence of clearly branded, 
externally-funded projects can serve as signals of the competence of a local government in 
providing goods and services to its community. Since many donor-funded development 
interventions directly target some local communities but not others, and since project 
implementation usually requires the consent and cooperation of local authorities, citizens 
might credit their local authorities for bringing a project into their community (Dietrich et al 
2015).   
 Cruz and Schneider (2014) show how local government officials in the Philippines reaped 
electoral benefits from the presence of a World Bank-funded and central government-
implemented development project. They present qualitative and quantitative evidence that 
receiving a project significantly increased the re-election prospects of mayors in recipient 
municipalities. They found that mayors would try to claim credit for projects by visiting the 
project sites and participating in activities such as ribbon-cutting.  
 Sacks (2012) uses multilevel analyses of Afrobarometer survey data to yield support for the 
argument that service provision by donors and non-state actors can strengthen, rather than 
undermine, the relationship between citizens and the state. 
 
4. Criticisms of branding  
Communications and raised expectations: Fishstein and Wilder (2012) state that the general 
consensus amongst the aid community in Afghanistan is that expectations were raised 
unrealistically high by the public relations and communications strategies of most national and 
international institutions, particularly in immediate years following 2001. The use of media outlets 
to highlight the positive actions being taken by donors generated significant cognitive dissonance 
between what Afghans were told was being done for them, and the tangible results on the 
ground. Challenges were underplayed and glossed over because they might undercut the 
positive narrative. According to Fishstein and Wilder (Ibid: 42), this communications strategy 
helps explain why Afghan survey respondents frequently expressed the view that “nothing has 
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been done”, in spite of the progress that had been achieved since the Taliban were removed 
from power. 
Undermines development: In a report that draws on the work of recent task forces that have 
examined US relations with Pakistan, Birdsall et al (2012) argue that an overemphasis on 
branding USAID projects has had perverse impacts on U.S. assistance. Rather than examine a 
project portfolio and then determine which should be branded and which should not, they 
suggest that the process often seems to work in reverse: the projects which are ultimately 
selected are those for which branding is possible. This means that some projects that cannot 
easily be branded—but are otherwise valuable—have not been pursued, while others that are 
more easily branded but less valuable often are. 
Birdsall et al (2012) argue that this fixation with branding is misguided on two counts. First, it 
shifts the donor’s objective away from improving long-run development outcomes toward making 
sure the donor gets credit for what it is doing. Second, branding can be counterproductive in 
places where the general public are wary of the use of development funds to attempt to buy good 
will. The authors urge donors to focus less on branding and more on improving the transparency 
of development efforts, as greater transparency will encourage more care over where money is 
spent and for what purpose. 
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